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CASES NOTED
WILLS - REVOCABILITY OF MUTUAL WILLS - JURISDICTION
OF THE PROBATE COURT IN FLORIDA
A husband and wife executed a mutual will disposing of their property.
They covenanted to waive all rights to alter, amend or revoke the instrument
under any circumstances after the death of one of them. Subsequent to
the husband's death, the wife executed an individual will revoking all prior
instruments. The wife died. Appellant, the named executor in both wills,
petitioned the county judge's court (probate court) to probate the in-
dividual will. The probate judge, in considering both instruments, refused
to admit the individual will to probate. He held that the mutual will was
irrevocable and entitled to probate upon proof of execution, as this was
the intention of the parties. On appeal, held, reversed: a mutual will
possesses the inherent quality of revocability, and may be voided, notwith-
standing the existence of covenants to the contrary. The probate court
has no jurisdiction to decide the validity of and to enforce these covenants.
In re Shepherd's Estate, 130 So.2d 888 (Fla. App. 1961).
Revocability is an essential characteristic of a will.' However, Anglo-
American jurisdictions have reached conflicting results on the question of
whether or not a joint and reciprocal will, 2 executed pursuant to a contract
or containing a covenant not to revoke, is nevertheless revocable.
1. Allen v. Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771 (1906); Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal.
2d 469, 45 P.2d 198 (1935); Keith v. Culp, 111 So.2d 278 (Fla. App. 1959); Shawver
v. Parks, 239 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96
S.E. 749 (1918); 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1709 (3d ed. 1941); 34 FLA. JUR. Wills § 106 (1961).
2. Since the courts use the terms "mutual will" and "joint and reciprocal will"
interchangeably, the writer will conform to this practice throughout the article.
A "joint" will is a single testamentary instrument which contains the wills of two
or more persons. It is executed jointly and disposes of property owned jointly, in common
or in severalty by the testators. Daniels v. Bridges, 123 Cal. App. 2d 585, 588, 267 P.2d
343, 345 (1954); Curry v. Cotton, 356 Il1. 538, 543, 191 N.E. 307, 309 (1934); In re
Johnson's Estate, 233 Iowa 782, 786, 10 N.W.2d 664, 667 (1943); In re Cole's Will, 171
N.C. 74, 75, 87 S.E. 962, 963 (1916). A "reciprocal" will is one in which the testators
name each other as beneficiaries under similar testamentary plans. Neipp v. Toolen,
313 Ill. App. 28, 31, 38 N.E.2d 980, 981 (1942). A will executed pursuant to an agree-
ment between two or more persons to dispose of their property in a particular manner,
each in consideration of the other is called a "mutual" will. A mutual will, if it con-
tains no provisions for third persons, constitutes a single will and is the will of. the first to
die and has no further existence as the will of the survivor. Maurer v. Tohansson, 223
Iowa 1102, 1105, 274 N.W. 99, 101 (1937). The contractual element is the distinguish-
ing feature of a "mutual" will. Culver v. Hess. 234 Iowa 877. 883, 14 N.W.2d 602.
695 (1944); In re Schroeder's Estate, 228 Iowa 1198, 1202, 293 N.W. 492, 494 (1940).
For an extensive discussion of mutual, reciprocal and joint wills, see Annot., 169 A.L.R.
9 (1947).
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Confusion was created at the very outset. In 1769, this issue was
raised for the first time in Dufour v. Pereira.3 This case, as reported by
Dickens, stated that a mutual will is irrevocable after the death of one
of the testators. It has been contended 4 that the opinion reported by
Dickens was inadequate and that a better perspective of the case was
reported by Hargrave, 5 wherein he stated that "though a will is always
revocable, and the last must always be the testator's will; yet a man may
so bind his assets by agreement, that his will shall be a trustee for the
performance of his agreement."" Whether the will remained irrevocable
after death or whether the will was revocable but the contract irrevocable
was still in doubt. Legal writers7 then began to distinguish clearly between
contractual rights under a will and the properties of the will per se.
However, even today many courts have continued to create confusion by
the use of loose language when discussing the "right to revoke." Although
they apparently intend to say that the contract to make the will is irrevo-
cable, they set forth the proposition that the will, which was made in
compliance with the contract, is irrevocable." This authority can usually
be dismissed as a judicial accident or mistake which is not adhered to even
in the jurisdiction in which it was decided. 9
3. 1 Dick. 419, 21 Eng. Rep. 332 (Ch. 1769).
4. SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS (1956); Rheinstein, Contracts to Make
a Will, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1224, 1227, 1230 (1955).
5. 2 HARGRAVE, JURISCONSULT EXERCITATIONS 99 (1811).
6. Id. at 105.
7. ATKINSON, WILLS § 49 (2d ed. 1953); 4 PACE, WILLS § 1709 (3d ed. 1941).
Some early courts could not distinguish a will from the contract upon which it was based.
They held that if a will was based upon a contract, the will was irrevocable and, therefore,
it was invalid because all wills are inherently revocable. Clayton v. Liverman, 19 N.C.
532 (1837); see Hershy v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17 (1879); Walker v. Walker, 140 Ohio St.
157 (1862).
8. lanes v. Rogers, 224 Ark. 116, 271 S.W.2d 930 (1954). The court states that
all wills are revocable unless based upon a binding contract. The court then states that
the proper remedy is in equity and not in attempting to probate the mutual will; Brown v.
lohanson, 69 Colo. 400, 194 Pac. 943 (1921); Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W.
998 (1910) (confusing language); Brown v. Webster, 90 Neb. 591, 134 N.W. 185
(1912); Murphy v. Slaton, 154 Tex. 35, 43, 273 S.W.2d 588, 593 (1954). In the
Murphy case the court stated that the survivor could not revoke the mutual will because
it was based upon a contract. In the very next paragraph the court stated that "Annie
E. Murphy technically could have revoked her will, but the beneficiaries under the joint
will, as probated at the death of B. H. Murphy, would have had a cause of action to
come into court with an equitable proceeding and receive their rights under such probated
joint will."; SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS, 40, 131 (1956).
9. Walker v. Yarbrough, 200 Ala. 458, 76 So. 390 (1917) seems to be in conflict
with Allen v. Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771 (1906). In re Crawford's Estate, 69
Cal. App. 2d 607, 160 P.2d 64 (1945) held that a will inconsistent with a prior contract
could not be probated: however. nflher cases in California are contrary. In re Roll's Estate,
193 Cal. 594, 226 Pac. 608 (1924); In re Carpenter's Estate, 104 Cal. App. 33, 285
Pac. 348 (1930); see In re Berry's Estate, 195 Cal. 354, 233 Pac. 330 (1925). In
Note, Recent Development of the Iowa Law of foint and Mutual Wills, 44 IOWA L. REV.
523, 536 (1959), the writer states that wills are revocable and contracts to make wills
are irrevocable in Iowa, The writer acknowledges the confusion in the Iowa courts and
sets forth the Iowa cases which favor and oppose revocation of wills based upon contracts.
The following cases are in favor of revocation: In re Farley's Estate, 237 Iowa 1069. 24
N.W.2d 453 (1946); In re Tohnson's Estate, 233 Iowa 782, 10 N.W.2d 664 (1943)
CASES NOTED
In the vast majority of states, a joint and reciprocal will may be
revoked during the lives of the testators, or after death by the surviving
parties, regardless of whether or not the will was drawn and executed in
accordance with a contractual obligation or a covenant "not to revoke."10
This, however, does not mean that one may avoid his obligation under
the contract by revoking the will. It is the contract and not the mutual
will which is irrevocable.11
A minority of courts have failed to recognize the distinction between
the effect of an instrument as both a will and a contract. They hold this
instrument, joint and reciprocal in its provisions and executed in fulfillment
of a contractual devise or bequest, to be an irrevocable will if the contract
is one which equity should enforce.
12
(dictum); Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N.W. 619 (1919) (dictum); Baker
v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (1910). Other cases are against inherent revocabil-
ity: In re Ramthun's Estate, 249 Iowa 790, 797, 89 N.W.2d 337, 341 (1958) (dictum);
Child v. Smith, 225 Iowa 1205, 282 N.W. 313 (1938); Maurer v. lohansson, 223 Iowa
1102, 1109, 274 N.W. 99, 103 (1937) (dictum); Powell v. McBlain, 222 Iowa 799, 802.
269 N.W. 883, 885 (1936) (dictum); Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 391,
153 N.W. 56, 58 (1915) (dictum). The courts of Kansas and Texas are in the same
state as the Iowa courts -confused. See cases cited notes 10, 12 infra; SPARKS, CON-
TRACTS TO MAKE WILLS, 40, 131 (1956).
10. Pohlman v. Untzellman, 2 Lee 319, 161 Eng. Rep. 355 (Prerogative Ct. 1756);
Allen v. Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771 (1906); In re Roll's Estate, 193 Cal. 594,
226 Pac. 608 (1924); In re Carpenter's Estate, 104 Cal. App. 33, 285 Pac. 348 (1930);
Keith v. Culp, 111 So.2d 278 (Fla. App. 1959); In re Briick's Estate, 24 Ill. App. 2d 77,
164 N.E.2d 82 (1959); Manrow v. Deveney, 109 Ind. App. 264, 33 N.E.2d 371 (1941);
In re Farley's Estate, 237 Iowa 1069, 24 N.W.2d 453 (1946); Baker v. Syfritt, 147
Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (1910); In re Adkins' Estate, 161 Kan. 239, 167 P.2d 618
(1946); Bray v. Cooper, 145 Kan. 642, 66 P.2d 592 (1937); Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan.
207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924); Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, 29 N.E. 1151 (1892);
In re Hirschhom's Estate, 76 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Surr. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 852,
77 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1948); In re Gudewicz's Will, 72 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Surr. Ct. 1947);
Schley v. Donlin, 131 Misc. 208, 225 N.Y.S. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Williams v. Chastain,
221 Ore. 69, 350 P.2d 430 (1960); Florey v. Meeker, 194 Ore. 257, 240 P.2d 1177
(1952); In re Lieurance's Estate, 181 Ore. 646, 182 P.2d 969, rehearing denied, 185
P.2d 575 (1947); In re Burke's Estate, 66 Ore. 252, 134 Pac. 11 (1913); Shawver v.
Parks, 239 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643,
96 S.E. 749 (1918); Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924); 4 PACE.
WILLS § 1709 (3d ed. 1941); 34 FLA. JUR. Wills § 143 (1961). In California, by statute.
mutual wills are revocable. CAL. PROB. CODE § 23 (1931); In Georgia, by statute, mutual
wills containing covenants "not to revoke" are still revocable. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 113-104,
113-401 (1959). Mutual wills are revocable although there has been an agreement or
compact not to revoke. ATKINSON. WILLS § 49 (2d ed. 1953).
11. Allen v. Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771 (1906); Keith v. Culp, Ill So.2d
278, 281 (Fla. App. 1959); Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924):
Schondelmaver v. Schondelmayer, 320 Mich. 565, 31 N.W.2d 721 (1948): Keasey v.
Engles, 259 Mich. 178, 242 N.W. 878 (1932); Irwin v. First Nat'l Bank, 212 Ore. 534.
321 P.2d 299 (1958): Seat v. Sent, 172 Tenn. 618. 113 S.W.2d 751 (1938): Shawver
v. Parks, 239 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wash. 2d 35, 129
P.2d 813 (1942); Estate of Schefe. 261 Wis. 113, 52 N.W.2d 375 (1952): Doyle v.
Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924); ATKINSON, WILLS § 49 (2d ed. 1953); 4
PACE, WILLS § 1709 (3d ed. 1941).
12. Dufour v. Pereira, 1 D;ck. 419, 29 Eng. Rep. 332 (Ch. 1769); A will made in
accordance with a contractual obligation is revocable, but the doctrine is that the parties
are under a restriction not to revoke and, therefore, neither can revoke without notice.
Robinson v. Mnndell. 20 Fed. Cas. 1027. 10 3 (No. 11959) (C.C. Mass. 1868); Walker
v. Yarbrough, 200 Ala. 458, 76 So. 390 (1917); Estate of Crawford, 69 Cal. App. 2d
607, 160 P.2d 64 (1945); Brown v. Johanson. 69 Colo. 400, 194 Pac. 943 (1920); Curry
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In the absence of statutory provisions, an action for damages 13 or
equitable relief,' 4 based upon a contractual breach under joint and recipro-
cal wills, does not lie within the jurisdiction of a probate court.1" Generally,
the jurisdiction of probate is limited to determining whether or not the
will is the last will of the decedent.
1 6
In the instant case, the probate judge determined that the mutual
will was irrevocable, rationalizing that this was the intention of the parties,
as evidenced by the covenant "not to revoke."' 7 Although contending that
the contractual agreement to make the mutual will was evidenced by the
instrument, the probate judge stated that he had no authority to exercise
equitable jurisdiction to determine the validity of the contract."' However,
he concluded that for the parties to litigate the cause in the circuit court,
in an action for specific performance of the contract or the imposition of a
trust upon the estate, would subject the estate and beneficiaries to multiple
litigation.' 9
v.. Cotton, 356 Il1. 538, 191 N.E. 307 (1934); Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E.
216 (1909) (court set aside probate of a will which revoked a prior will that was based
upon a contract); Child v. Smith, 225 Iowa 1205, 282 N.W. 313 (1938); Estate of
Ramthun, 249 Iowa 790, 797, 89 N.W.2d 337, 341 (1958) (dictum); Maurer v. ohans-
son, 223 Iowa 1102, 1109, 274 N.,. 99, 103 (1937) (dictum); Campbell v. Dunkel-
berger, 172 Iowa 385, 391, 153 N.W. 56, 58 (1915) (dictum); Warwick v. Zimmerman,
126 Kan. 619, 270 Pac. 612 (1928); Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 Pac. 421 (1919)
(husband could not set aside a mutual will when his first wife had died and he had
accepted benefits under the instrument, even though he married again); Estate of McCin-
ley, 257 Pa. 478, 101 Atl. 807 (1917); Estate of Swenk, 176 Pa. Super. 513, 108 A.2d
825 (1954); Murphy v. Slaton, 273 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. 1954); Weidner v. Crowther, 291
S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs, 219 S.W. 839 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1920).
13. Curry v. Cotton, supra note 12; In re Farley's Estate, 237 Iowa 1069, 24 N.W.2d
453 (1946); Larrabee v. Porter, 166 S.W. 395, 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Note, Recent
Development of the Iowa Law of joint and Mutual Wills, 44 IowA L. REV. 523, 540
(1959); Costigan, Constructive Trusts Based on Promises Made to Secure Bequests.
Devises, or Intestate Succession, 28 HaRv. L. REV. 237, 251 (1915); 97 C.I.S. \Wills §
1367 (1957); Annot., 169 A.L.R. 55 (1947).
14. lanes v. Rogers, 271 S.W.2d 930 (Ark. 1954); James v. Pawsey, 328 P.2d 1023
(Cal. App. 1958); Hoff v. Armbruster, 122 Colo. 563, 226 P.2d 312 (1950); Moskovits v.
Moskovits, 112 So.2d 875 (Fla. App. 1959); Baker v. Svfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998
(1910); Waters v. Harper, 250 P.2d 915 (Nev. 1952); Minogue v. Lipman, 25 N.J.
Super, 376, 96 A.2d 426 (Ch.), aff'd. 28 N.J. Super. 330, 100 A.2d 684 (App. Div.
1953); Murphy v. Slaton, 273 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. 1954); Veidner v. Crowther, 291
S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); ATKINSON, WILLS § 49 (2d ed. 1953); 4 PACE,
WILLS § 1709 (3d ed. 1941); 34 FLA. JUR. iVills S 108 (1961).
15. Manrow v. Deveney, 109 Ind. App. 264, 33 N.E.2d 371 (1941); Lansing v.
Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N.W. 699 (1893); In re Sandberg's Will, 75 Misc. 38, 134 N.Y.
Supp. 869 (Surr. Ct. 1911); Shawver v. Parks, 239-S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
Such jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties. Fuller v. Nelle, 12
Cal. App. 2d 576, 55 P.2d 1248 (1936).
16. Sumner v. Crane. 155 Mass. 483, 29 N.E. 1151 (1892); Lansing v. Haynes, 95
Mich. 16. 54 NAV. 699 (1893); Pullen v. Russ, 209 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948):
Chitwood v. Collins, 122 V. Va. 267. 8 S.E.2d 830 (1940); Costigan, Constructive Trusts
Based on Promises Made to Secure Bequests, Devises, or Intestate Succession, 28 HARV.
L. REV. 237, 248. 249 n.24 (1915).
17. In re Shepherd's Estate. 130 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla. App. 1961). The probate
judge did not hold the mutual will irrevocable based upon a contract to make the will.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid. In 1957, the Florida Legislature enacted § 731.051 of the Florida Stat
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In reversing the decision, the district court of appeal20 held that
revocability is an essential element of all wills; thus, notwithstanding the
existence of a covenant to the contrary, a mutual will may be revoked.
2
1
A probate court "cannot admit a mutual will to probate where it has been
revoked by the testator;22 nor can he [sic] enforce an agreement to make
a mutual will by ordering probate of that will where it has been revoked
by the testator in violation of the agreement. -2 3 Although revocation will
not circumvent or avoid a valid contractual obligation, "whether or not
revocation constitutes a breach of contract . . . is a matter to be dealt with
in the proper forum."
24
The court further stated that there is no constitutional 25 or legislative
2
6
authority which will permit the probate court to apply equitable remedies
to decide the validity of and to enforce an agreement made between husband
and wife to dispose of their property through a mutual will 27 or a covenant
not to revoke the mutual will. 28
utes. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-148, § 1, at 251. This section provides that all agreements
to make a will must be in writing. The section also states that it applies to agreements
made on, after, or prior to lanuary 1, 1958.
This section has been held to be violative of § 17 of the Florida Constitution,
when applied to agreements made prior to January 1, 1958. The violation relates to the
passing of any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Keith v. Culp, 111 So.2d 278,
280-81 (Fla. App. 1959).
The contractual agreement in Shepherd was made prior to the enactment of §
731.051.
20. The court relied upon a Florida case, wherein it was stated that "mutual wills
are ambulatory like other wills, i.e., revocability is an essential element of all wills.
Thus, it is not the wills, which are made in pursuance of a contract, that are irrevocable,
but the contract upon which they, are made that stands and may be enforced .... And
this is true even though there is a covenant not to revoke." Keith v. Culp, 111 So.2d
278, 281 (Fla. App. 1959).
21. In re Shepherd's Estate, 130 So.2d 888 (Fla. App. 1961).
22. See Hoff v. Armbruster, 122 Colo. 563, 226 P.2d 312 (1950); 97 C.I.S. Wills
§ 1367 (1957).
23. In re Shepherd's Estate, 130 So.2d 888, 891 (Fla. App. 1961). The statements
made by the district court of appeal which relate to agreements to make mutual wills are
dicta. The court was faced only with the problem of the revocability of a mutual will
containing a covenant against revocation. It is doubtful whether there are any cases in
the United States "on all fours" with the instant case. The Keith and the Williams
cases, cited by the district court of appeal on page 890 of the opinion, can be distinguished
easily. Neither case states that there was a written covenant not to revoke contained in
the respective wills in those cases. See Rheinstein, Contracts to Make a Will, 30 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1224, 1226 (1955).
24. In re Shepherd's Estate, 130 So.2d 888, 891 (Fla. App. 1961).
25. Ibid. The court stated that § 7(3) of article V, of the Florida Constitution is
the pertinent section relating to the jurisdiction of the probate court. However, the court
could not interpret the language of that section to mean that the probate court had
equity jurisdiction.
26. In re Shepherd's Estate, 130 So.2d 888, 891 (Fla. App. 1961). Sections 732.01
and 733.32 of the Florida Statutes (1961) were stated to be the pertinent legislation
relating to the problems before the court. The court would not construe these legislative
enactments as granting equity jurisdiction to the probate court.
27. In re Shepherd's Estate, 130 So.2d 888, 891 (Fla. App. 1961).
28. Id. at 892. A will based upon a contract and containing a covenant against
revocation may nevertheless be revoked by the testator. The remedy by the aggrieved
party is an action at law or in equity to enforce the contract. However, under the Florida
statutes, the county judge may have jurisdiction to enforce this contract also, as the
1961]
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From a practical standpoint, when the testator's last will revokes a
prior will which he was contractually obligated not to revoke, it makes
little difference whether or not the last will is probated. In this situation,
the property in the hands of the beneficiaries under the last will may be
impressed with a trust by a court of equity. "° The final effect will be the
same as though the first will which was based upon a contractual obliga-
tion, was held to be irrevocable and entitled to probate. 30
This writer does not suggest that the law relating to the revocability
of wills3 ' be changed. However, it is suggested that the Florida Legislature
take cognizance of the procedure in New York, Ohio and Kansas, where,
by statute,32 the probate court is conferred sufficient equity jurisdiction to
determine the validity of and to enforce contracts relating to the disposition
of a decedent's estate.33 This result is achieved through an accounting
proceeding in which the court has the power to impose a trust on the
property involved.34 The reduction of prolonged and multiple litigation,
and the economic good to be accomplished would greatly outweigh any
occasional abuse which could easily be corrected on appeal.
The rationale behind this procedure is set forth in Raymond v. Davis'
Estate,3 5 wherein Judge Cardozo stated: "To remit the claimant to another
county judge's court is a court of equity insofar as the constitution grants to it certain
exclusive jurisdiction. If the county judge's court does have jurisdiction to enforce this
contract in a proceeding filed for that purpose, or to probate the will, thus enforcing the
contract, it derives the jurisdiction from the statute giving the county judge's court jurisdic-
tion to enforce contracts of the decedent for the sale or transfer of real or personal property.
FLA. STAT. § 733.32 (1961). 1 REDFERN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN
FLORIDA § 11 (3d ed. 1957). The court in the instant case states that the county judge
has no power to interpret and enforce contracts under § 733.32. This section concerns"cases where written agreements have been made for the sale and conveyance or transfer
of real property in this state or of personal property, and the vendor has died before making
such conveyance or transfer . . ..
29. In re Boyd's Will, 203 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Surr. Ct. 1960); In re Venblow's Estate, 2
App. Div. 2d 365, 156 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1956); ATKINSON, WILLS § 49 (2d ed. 1953); 4
PAGE, WILLS § 1709 (3d ed. 1941).
30. Note, Recent Development of the Iowa Law of Joint and Mutual Wills, 44
IOWA L. REV. 523, 539 (1959) (The irrevocable instrument is really the "legal" will
although it may not be the "last" will.); Goddard, Mutual Wills, 17 MICl. L. REV. 677,
686 (1919).
31. See note 1 suptra and accompanying text.
32. N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act § 40 (1921); 0mo REV. CODE ANN. § 2101.24
(Baldwin 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-301 (1949). The courts handling probate
matters in England have full equity jurisdiction. Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66; 3
PACE, WILLS § 26.17, at 54 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961).
33. In re Adkins' Estate, 161 Kan. 239, 167 P.2d 618 (1946); In re Venblow's
Estate, 2 App. Div. 2d 365, 156 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1956); Schley v. Donlin, 131 Misc. 208,
225 N.Y. Supp. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1927); In re Boyd's Will, 203 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Surr. Ct.
1960); In re Gudewicz's Will, 72 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Surr. Ct. 1947); In re McGrath's
Estate, 133 Misc. 30, 231 N.Y. Supp. 359 (Surr. Ct; 1928); In re Hawes' Estate, 119
Misc. 359, 196 N.Y. Supp. 255 (Surr. Ct. 1922); Coster, The Equitable Jurisdiction of
Surrogate's Courts in New York, 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 199 (1936).
34. In re Boyd's Will, 203 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Surr. Ct. 1960). The surrogate court has
no power to grant specific performance. In re Venblow's Estate, 2 App. Div. 2d 365,
156 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1956); Note, Equitable Jurisdiction of Probate Courts and Finality of
Probate Decrees, 48 YALE L.I. 1273, 1278 (1939).
35. 248 N.Y. 67, 161 N.E. 421 (1928).
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forum after all these advances and retreats, these reconnaissances and
skirmishes, would be a postponement of justice equivalent to a denial. If




CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION -
SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS
Four cases testing the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws' of
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, as being violative of the estab-
lishment of religion clause of the first amendment, 2 were decided as corollary
cases by the United States Supreme Court. A divided Court3 held: it is
not a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment 5 for a
state to set aside Sunday as a uniform day of rest for all citizens, even
though these Sunday laws were originally enacted to aid the predominant
Christian sects. A state is not prevented from achieving its secular goals
because a law coincides or harmonizes with the tenets of certain religions. 6
McGowan v. Maryland, 81 Sup.'Ct. 1101, 1153, 1218 (1961); 7 Gallagher v.
36. Id. at 72, 161 N.E. at 423.
1. Also known as "blue laws," a name given to colonial statutes of New Haven,
Connecticut regulating the religious and personal conduct of citizens. The laws were
bound in blue books. It is used today to describe statutes applying strict Mosaic prin-
ciples. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 218 (4th ed. 1951); 1 BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 373
(3d rev. 1914); WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 296 (2d ed. unabridged
1951). This term was used in the opinions of the courts below. Two Guys From Har-
rison-Allentown. Inc. v. McGinley, 179 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Crown Kosher
Super Market, Inc. v. Gallagher, 176 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1959); McGowan v. State,
220 Md. 117, 151 A.2d 156 (1959). For a view that "blue laws" never existed see
MARTIN, THE DAY 28-30 (1933).
2. Other major issues discussed and found not to be violative of the Constitution
were: the free exercise of religion clause of the first amendment as applied to members
of the Orthodox Jewish faith who closed their stores on Saturday, their Sabbath; the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as applied to the classifications of
exemptions itemized in the statutes; and the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment as applied to the vagueness and restrictiveness of these statutes. For a discussion
of these issues prior to the present decisions, see Comment, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1192
(1959).
3. Chief Justice Warren wrote the four majority opinions. Justice Frankfurter
joined by Justice Harlan wrote a single concurring opinion for all four cases. Justice
Douglas wrote a single dissenting opinion covering all four cases. Justices Black, Brennan,
Stewart, and Frankfurter concurred and dissented on some of the other issues.
4. Only justice Douglas dissented to this holding.
5. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." (Italics indicate the "establishment clause.")
6. [Since the remainder of the text will handle only the establishment of religion
issue which is interwoven through all the opinions, subsequent citations to the instant
cases will be by citing McGowan v. Maryland, 81 Sup. Ct. and the applicable page.]
7. This case affirmed a Maryland Court of Appeals decision upholding the con-
viction of seven employees of a discount department store for selling on Sunday a three
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